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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services |
The Trump administration’s aggressive immigration crackdown, relaunched in January 2025, has taken a contentious turn with plans to deport migrants to Libya and Rwanda, as reported by CNN and The Washington Post. Discussions with both nations aimed to send migrants with criminal records or those deemed undesirable, with a U.S. military flight to Libya planned for May 7, 2025. However, the initiative faced swift backlash: Libya’s rival governments rejected the proposal, a federal judge blocked the deportations for violating due process, and human rights groups condemned the plan, citing Libya’s notorious detention conditions. Rwanda, meanwhile, remains open to accepting deportees, raising parallels to a failed UK scheme.
Details of the Deportation Plan
Since President Donald Trump’s return to office, his administration has pursued mass deportations, deporting 152,000 people by May 5, 2025, per the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Secretary of State Marco Rubio, at a May 6 Cabinet meeting, outlined plans to send “the most despicable human beings” to distant countries to prevent border re-entry, targeting Libya for a potential “safe third country” agreement to process U.S.-intercepted asylum seekers. A military C-17 flight from San Antonio to Misrata, Libya, was prepared, targeting migrants from Vietnam, Laos, and the Philippines, among others.
Rwanda, having accepted an Iraqi deportee in March 2025, is in talks to receive more migrants who have served U.S. sentences, offering social integration rather than imprisonment, unlike El Salvador’s CECOT prison deal. The Rwandan plan, costing more per person than El Salvador’s $6 million agreement for 300 migrants, draws on Kigali’s 2022 UK deal, which was scrapped in 2024 after legal challenges.
Libyan Rejection and Human Rights Concerns
Libya’s divided authorities—Tripoli’s UN-backed Government of National Unity, led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, and Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army in the east—categorically rejected the deportation plan on May 7. Dbeibah stated on social media that Libya “refuses to be a destination for deportations under any pretext,” while Haftar’s forces called it a violation of sovereignty. Libya’s detention centers, described as “hellish” by Amnesty International in 2022, are notorious for forced labor, torture, and sexual violence, with a 2024 UN report noting ongoing human rights violations. The U.S. State Department’s Level 4 travel advisory warns against travel to Libya due to conflict and crime.
Human rights advocates, including Médecins Sans Frontières and the American Immigration Council, condemned the plan. Aaron Reichlin-Melnick posted on X, highlighting Libya’s “hellscape” facilities rife with trafficking and slavery, urging public attention to the policy’s cruelty. Posts on X also reflect polarized sentiment, with some supporting Trump’s hardline stance and others decrying the humanitarian risks.
Judicial Intervention
On May 7, 2025, U.S. District Judge Brian E. Murphy, a Biden appointee, issued a temporary restraining order, clarifying that deportations to Libya or other third countries like Saudi Arabia violate his April 18 injunction. This earlier ruling mandates written notice and a 15-day window for migrants to contest deportations to non-origin countries if they fear persecution or torture. Murphy rejected the administration’s claim that the Pentagon, not DHS, could bypass the order, stating DHS cannot “evade” it by transferring responsibility. Immigration lawyers, representing Asian migrants, reported clients were coerced into signing deportation consents under duress, prompting the emergency filing.
Stephen Miller, a Trump advisor, labeled the ruling a “judicial coup,” while Trump claimed ignorance of the Libya flight, redirecting inquiries to DHS. The Pentagon and White House offered no comment, and the State Department avoided discussing diplomatic details.
Broader Context and Challenges
The Libya and Rwanda plans build on Trump’s January 2025 executive order to secure third-country deportation agreements, following deals with El Salvador and Colombia. The administration has also approached Angola, Benin, Eswatini, and Moldova, though Angola declined. Critics argue the policy targets migrants indiscriminately, with cases like Kilmar Abrego Garcia, deported to El Salvador despite no gang ties, fueling lawsuits from the ACLU and others. A Supreme Court order in April 2025 halted some Venezuelan deportations, signaling further legal battles.
Libya’s role as a migrant transit hub to Europe, coupled with its documented abuses, amplifies the controversy. Rwanda’s human rights record, despite its “safe” claim, raises concerns about secondary deportations to unsafe countries. The UK’s failed Rwanda scheme underscores the legal and ethical hurdles Trump’s policy faces.
Key Details of Trump’s Deportation Plan
Aspect | Details |
---|---|
Target Countries | Libya, Rwanda; talks with Angola, Benin, Eswatini, Moldova |
Libya Plan | Military C-17 flight planned for May 7, 2025; blocked by Judge Murphy |
Rwanda Plan | Accepts deportees post-sentence; integration, not imprisonment |
Judicial Ruling | Deportations to third countries require notice, 15-day contest period |
Human Rights Concerns | Libya’s “hellscape” detention centers; Rwanda’s risky record |
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Why is the Trump administration targeting Libya for deportations?
The administration seeks to send migrants with criminal records to distant countries to deter illegal border crossings, with Libya eyed for a “safe third country” agreement.
Why did Libya reject the deportation plan?
Both Tripoli’s government and Haftar’s eastern forces denied agreements, citing sovereignty and refusing to accept foreign deportees.
How did the U.S. court intervene?
Judge Brian Murphy blocked the Libya deportations on May 7, 2025, for violating his April injunction requiring due process for third-country deportations.
What is Rwanda’s role in the plan?
Rwanda is negotiating to accept deportees, integrating them with social support, following a precedent set with one Iraqi migrant in March 2025.
Conclusion
The Trump administration’s push to deport migrants to Libya and Rwanda, announced in May 2025, has collided with legal, diplomatic, and humanitarian barriers. Libya’s unified rejection, a federal judge’s blockade for due process violations, and global outcry over human rights abuses in Libyan detention centers have stalled the plan. Rwanda’s willingness to accept deportees offers an alternative but echoes a legally fraught UK precedent. As Trump’s team navigates these setbacks, the policy’s future hinges on resolving judicial challenges and addressing international condemnation, with significant implications for U.S. immigration strategy.